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Russian-Turkish relations have deteriorated sharply in the aftermath of Turkey shooting down a
Russian aircraft in November. Didem Buhari-Gulmez assesses how the situation is likely to
develop in the coming months. She writes that there is little consensus over what the lasting
implications will be for relations between the two countries, with both Vladimir Putin and Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan showing no signs of backing down from their war of words.
The shooting down of the Russian Su-24 bomber by a Turkish F-16 combat aircraft on 24 November
represents a historical turning point in Turkish-Russian relations. The act, which took place right
after the G-20 meeting in Antalya where disagreements over the ongoing war in Syria were already visible, was
immediately denounced by Vladimir Putin as a “stab in the back by the accomplices of terrorists”.
While Russia has supported Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad by actively striking against the latter’s opponents,
the western alliance is presently facing a serious dilemma over its response to the crisis in the country. The Paris
attacks and the refugee crisis have convinced many in the West to prioritise the fight against Islamic State. Yet
Turkey faces a much greater dilemma because as an immediate neighbour, it is directly exposed to terrorist attacks,
refugee flows and the economic and social crises emanating from Syria.
Syria, Putin and Erdoğan
Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rule, Turkey has openly
advocated the end of Assad’s rule ever since the Syrian
protests began in 2011. Turkey subsequently opened its
borders to refugees with the anticipation that the Syrian
conflict would be short-lived. Erdoğan’s resolute
opposition to the Assad administration was one reason
underpinning the rise of allegations that the Turkish
government (allegedly endorsed by the US) was training
and financing Syrian rebel groups like the al-Nusra Front,
who later joined the radical Islamist camp.
According to some critics, the Turkish government has
dragged its feet in the fight against Islamic State because
it considers the Kurdish insurgency to be a more
imminent threat. Consequently, Turkey’s position in Syria
remains ambiguous and contested. Turkey’s ambition to
become a “regional leader with global impact” has also
raised questions over whether the country is replacing its traditional western-oriented foreign policy with a more
autonomous policy in favour of representing non-western ‘underdog nations’ (especially in former Ottoman
territories).
Erdoğan’s close dialogue with Putin over the last decade, and particularly his request that Russia endorse Turkey’s
membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, have been considered part of Turkey’s strategy to diversify
its alliances. Even the Crimean Tatar problem related to Russia’s annexation of Crimea did not cause serious
tension in Turkish-Russian relations. However, both the publication by Syrian rebels of video footage of the late
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Russian pilot and the surviving Russian pilot’s allegation that Turkey had downed the jet without any warning
(rejected by Turkish authorities and western pilots) have increased Russia’s sense of resentment.
Russia has since resorted to sanctions against Turkish citizens, including businessmen, academics, sportsmen,
truck drivers, captains of ships and other individuals, denying them entry into Russian territory or revoking their
residence permits. The Russian government has also officially called back Russian nationals residing in Turkey.
Bilateral relations have been suspended in many sectors, including those related to the economy and the military,
while even Russia’s gas exports to Turkey have come under threat.
Furthermore, the Russian media has accused Erdoğan and his entourage of supporting Islamic State in return for
Syrian oil. The Turkish government’s response has been to accuse Russia of spreading propaganda against the
country and bombing Turkmen rebels in Syria: a predominantly Sunni Muslim minority seen by Turks as sharing
their heritage and identity. On 3-4 December, the Turkish foreign minister met his Russian counterpart for the first
time after the downing of the Russian jet and was told that the incident had changed the course of Russian-Turkish
relations for good.
The diversity of reactions in Turkey towards what is now being termed the ‘Russian crisis’ reflects the political
polarisation in the country. Turkey is divided between those who think that the downing of the Russian jet was a
legitimate act of self-defence, and those who blame the Turkish government for unnecessarily resorting to
aggressive policies that have already cost the country its diplomatic and economic relations with many neighbouring
states (including Egypt, Iraq, Israel). The latter camp emphasises that the historical airspace dispute between
Turkey and Greece did not automatically lead to the downing of Greek jets. They hence believe that the airspace
violation was just a pretext for Turkey to go back to its hard-line foreign policy of the 1990s, which was built on
issuing ‘casus belli’ threats.
The future of Russian-Turkish relations?
There is little consensus on what the lasting implications
of the jet crisis will be on Russian-Turkish relations. An
optimistic view would be that the Russian jet incident will
not escalate into a serious conflict because of the well-
established economic, social and cultural
interdependences between Turkey and Russia. Viewed
from this perspective, the recent exchange of threats
between the two countries is largely rhetorical and
temporary.
A slightly less optimistic analysis would be that Russian
sanctions against Turkey, including the suspension of
natural gas supply and energy projects (such as the
Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant and the TurkStream gas
pipeline), may lead to Turkey finding alternative partners
like Qatar to bypass Russia’s actions. It may also
encourage Turkey to reciprocate by imposing sanctions
on Russia and Russian nationals in Turkey. However, this perspective would perhaps underestimate Russia’s
capabilities and the extent to which Turkey is dependent on imports of Russian gas, which account for about 60 per
cent of the country’s gas requirements.
The most pessimistic interpretation, of course, would be that a further conflict between Russia and Turkey may be
imminent and that it could even result in a world war. From a longue durée perspective, the recent crisis is often
seen as a symptom rather than a cause, implying that the deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations is inevitable due
to a clash of geostrategic interests between two rising powers, Russia and pro-Western Turkey. This view holds
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Russia as primarily responsible for the deterioration of Turko-Russian relations by emphasising historical Russian
claims over the straits and the Mediterranean – which had reinforced Turkey’s orientation towards the West after
WWII – and Russia’s ethno-nationalistic foreign policy activism observed in, for example, Georgia and Ukraine.
Alternatively, a similarly pessimistic approach holds Turkey responsible for the conflict and claims that Turkey is
becoming alienated from the West because of its reckless policies, often perceived as expressing sectarian
interests. Accordingly, Turkey may lose the NATO security guarantees it enjoys and find itself isolated in an
international community that seeks to avoid direct confrontation with Russia at all costs. So far, the more optimistic
standpoints have prevailed in Turkey’s official rhetoric. Whether they overestimate the capability of Erdoğan’s
Turkey to peacefully deal with Putin’s Russia remains to be seen.
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